adjusted gross income. 5 Brokerage fees, in contrast, are treated as capital expenditures 6 which are proper adjustments to basis. 7 Therefore, when a taxpayer sells a security with a higher basis (due to brokerage fee adjustments), he does not recognize as much gain as he would without the basis adjustment-thereby reducing his overall tax liability.
Section II of this article describes the various types of fees that taxpayers incur in investing in securities. Section III analyzes how the tax law treats investment advisory fees versus brokerage fees. Section IV examines the legislative history of particular sections of the IRC in order to understand Congress' intent in enacting them. Then section V analyzes the duties that investment advisors and brokers owe to their clients. Section VI scrutinizes the policy implications of the current tax Code. Finally section VII proposes revisions to the current tax code to better align the IRC with investors' expectations for their financial professionals.
II. Fees that Taxpayers Incur in Securities Investments

A. Types of Financial Services Professionals:
Although the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") 8 lists many designations 9 used to describe investment professionals, there are two main categories: (1) brokers and (2) registered investment advisors. 10 Brokers are regulated by the NASD and 5 See IRC § 67(a). 6 See Treasury Regulation ("Regulation") § 1.263(a)-2(e). 7 See IRC § 1016(a). 8 The NASD is a self regulated organization which serves as the primary private-sector regulator of America's securities industry. It oversees the activities of over 5,100 brokerage firms, and more than 657,690 registered securities representatives. The NASD licenses individuals and admits firms to the industry, writes rules governing their behavior, ensures regulatory compliance and sanctions those who do not comply. NASD also operates the largest securities dispute resolution forum in the world-processing over 8,000 arbitrations and 1,000 mediations per year. See the NASD website, available at www.nasd.com (last visited February 21, 2006) . 9 To view a complete list of NASD's professional designations and descriptions of each see http://apps.nasd.com/investor_Information/resources/designations/AllDesigByAcronym.asp (last visited February 21, 2006) . 10 This article will examine in detail three of these: commissions; feeonly; and fee-based accounts. 18 A. Commissions:
For investment professionals who charge commissions, they typically earn them on a transaction by transaction basis. 19 Brokers are the only investment professionals who are authorized to charge commissions. 20 To the extent that commissions depend on the volume of transactions, there is a built-in incentive for brokers to trade frequently (whether or not such trading is necessary for that particular investor). 21 Commission fees are not only incurred through the use of live brokers. Several companies primarily offer brokerage services online or via automated-service telephone for customers to effectuate transactions themselves without the assistance of a broker. 22 Even firms that primarily market live brokers, also offer online and telephonic services.
Some examples can best illustrate the actual fees that industry-leading companies charge their customers in brokerage commissions. For broker-assisted trades, Charles Schwab's commission rates range from $35 plus 1.70% of the principal trade size, for trades between $0-$2,499, and $270 plus 0.09% of the trade size for trades of $500,000 and over. . 19 Id. 20 Id. (Mr. Yankwitt noted that some investment advisors may also be brokers; in which case they may charge commissions). 21 See discussion infra Section V.A.ii. 22 Four major companies in this category are: E*Trade, Scottrade, Fidelity and Ameritrade. 23 Because the commission fees are notably less expensive with online transactions, it is logical to surmise that some level of advise is contemplated for the use of a live broker.
B. Fee-Only:
In a "fee-only" type arrangement the investment professional charges a either a flat annual fee or a flat percentage based on the size of the account and is indifferent to the number 25 Charles Schwab offers two fee accounts: (1) "Schwab Portfolios™ with Advised Investing," and (2) "Schwab Advisor Network®." 38 "Schwab Portfolios™" charges 1.25% of the eligible assets in the account and "Schwab Advisor Network®" charges an average of 1% of the assets under management.
Id
39
Thus the fee-only arrangement, unlike a commission arrangement, is indifferent to the quantity of transactions made on an account.
C. Fee-based accounts:
In the case of fee-based accounts, companies either charge both fees and commissions or charge fees and receive other revenue streams that are commission-like. 40 For these account, as in fee-only accounts, the fees are generated based on the amount of assets under management.
41
In fee-based accounts, however, the investment professional receives additional revenue, either from commissions, 12(b)(1) fees or from other revenue sharing arrangements, depending on the products purchased or sold by the client.
42
When major brokerage firms began offering feebased accounts in 1999, there was some debate as to whether brokers would be regulated under the IAA when servicing such accounts because the charges were based both on commissions and advice-related fees. 43 On April 12, 2005, however, the SEC adopted Rule 202(a)(11)-1, which 35 Id. 36 Ameriprise Financial Services also offers other fee-based advisory services available in separate "wrap accounts." Part of the annual asset-based fee for the advice and related services on the assets in the wrap account is paid to your advisor. This fee includes transactional fees and could be ideal for clients who prefer not to pay fees for each transaction like they would in a typical brokerage account. 46 Thus, Ameriprise and its brokers may enjoy the lower fiduciary duty standards imposed on brokers while offering an investment advisory type account. Charles Schwab also offers two types of fee-based accounts: "Advised Investing Signature," and "Schwab Private Client™." 47 In the descriptions of both accounts, some level of advice is contemplated, yet a footnote is careful to disclose that the accounts are "brokerage accounts." The footnote states:
These are brokerage services. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires all broker-dealers who give brokerage advice for a fee to make the following disclosure. Accounts enrolled in these services are brokerage accounts and not advisory accounts. Our interests may not always be the same as yours. Please ask us questions to make sure you understand your rights and our obligations to you, including the extent of our obligations to disclose conflicts of interest and to act in your best interest and to act in your best interest. We are paid both by you and, sometimes, by people who compensate us based on what you buy. Therefore, our profits, and our salespersons' compensation, may vary by product 44 See IAA, supra note 13. 45 Rule 202(a)(11)-1, 17 C.F.R. §275.202(a)(11)-1. 46 See Ameriprise Financial website, supra note 28. 47 The "Advised Investing Signature" account charges 0.50% on eligible assets, with a $250 quarterly minimum charge. 49 The first 60 equity trades per year will not incur any commission charges.
50
The minimum assets needed to maintain this account is $150,000.
51
The fees incurred in a "Schwab Private Client™" account are a maximum of 0.75% on eligible assets, with a minimum quarterly charge of $1,000.
52
The first 120 equity trades per year will not incur any commission charges. 53 The minimum amount of assets in this account is $500,000.
54
The fee-based account is a compelling example of the danger of providing preferential tax treatment for brokerage fees. Firms have successfully classified these accounts as brokerage accounts, thereby maintaining a lower fiduciary duty standard. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Id. 51 Id. 52 Id. 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 See Schwab, supra note 48, and accompanying text. 56 See discussion infra Section V.
III. How the Internal Revenue Code Treats Investment Advisory Fees and Brokerage Fees
A. Investment Advisory Fees:
Private investors frequently seek assistance from professionals when making investment decisions. Investment advisors almost always charge their clients fees for services rendered.
Generally speaking, investment advisory fees are considered personal expenses and therefore are not deductible under IRC § 262(a). 57 Yet, it will be very difficult for taxpayers to receive a tax benefit in connection with the fees paid for investment advice due to the narrow constraints of the IRC. Therefore, taxpayers must pay nearly all investment advisory fees out-of-pocket and likely are not able to deduct any of these expenses.
As a preliminary matter, a taxpayer will not be concerned about the deductibility of investment advisory fees unless he itemizes his deductions. IRC § 63(e) states in relevant part " [u] nless an individual makes an election under this subsection for the taxable year, no itemized deduction shall be allowed for the taxable year."
58
Once a taxpayer makes an election under IRC § 63(e) to itemize his/her deductions, the analysis turns to whether the fees paid to an investment advisor may be deductible. IRC § 212(2) allows for a deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year…(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income." 59 Treasury Regulation ("Regulation") § 1.212-1(b) defines income for the purposes of § 212 as: "… not merely income of the taxable year but also income which the taxpayer has realized in a prior taxable year or may realize in subsequent taxable years; and is not confined to recurring income but applies as well to gains from the disposition of property." 60 Regulation § 1.212-1(g) sets forth an example of a qualifying expenditure:
[f]ees for services of investment counsel, custodial fees, clerical help, office rent, and similar expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer in connection with investments held by him are deductible under section 212 only if (1) they are paid or incurred by the taxpayer for the production of income; and (2) they are ordinary and necessary under all the circumstances, having regard to the type of investment and to the relation of the taxpayer to such investment. "[e]xpenses for the production or collection of income for which a deduction is otherwise 60 Id. 61 Id. 62 76 T.C. 351, 364 (1981) 63 Id. 64 Id. at 365. 65 See IRC § 67(b). Therefore, a taxpayer may only deduct investment advisory fees to the extent that those fees exceed 2-percent of that taxpayers adjusted gross income.
68
In summary, a taxpayer may recognize a deduction for expenses that comply with § 212, if (1) those fees exceed 2-percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income and (2) the taxpayer makes an election under § 63(e) to itemize his deductions.
Example I:
In 2004 Rhonda (an individual taxpayer) has an adjusted gross income of $100,000 and spends $2,500 on investment advisory fees. Assume Rhonda elects to itemize her deductions.
Since Rhonda has decided to itemize her deductions 69 , the next inquiry is whether the fees she paid to her investment advisor exceed 2-percent of her adjusted gross income. 70 Two-percent of $100,000 is $2,000. The amount that Rhonda spent in excess of $2,000 may be deducted. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 See William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 304 (2005) (holding that even a trust's investment advisory fees are only deductible to the extent that they exceed two-percent of the trust's adjusted gross income). 69 See IRC § 67(e). 70 See IRC § 67(a).
Rhonda spent a total of $2,500 on investment advisory fees. Accordingly, Rhonda is able to deduct $500 from her taxable income. The remaining $2,000 will not be deductible.
B. Brokerage Fees:
Fees that investors pay in connection with acquiring or disposing of securities (brokerage fees) are treated, for tax purposes, entirely differently than investment advisory fees. Brokerage fees will result in a basis adjustment to a taxpayer's security regardless of his adjusted gross income or whether the taxpayer elects to itemize his deductions. Brokerage fees receive a favorable tax treatment when compared to investment advisory fees. )). 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 Id. Tom, in effect, has reduced his overall tax liability by $10, having properly adjusted his basis in Security X by the amount he paid in brokerage fees. For the reasons set forth in "Example II," Tom would be permitted to increase his basis in Security X to the extent of $10. Tom's investment advisory fees, however, would not be deductible. Two-percent of Tom's adjusted gross income is $1,600 (80,000 * .02). Tom only spent $20 on investment advisory fees, which is below the 2-percent floor of $1,600. Pursuant to IRC § 67(a), Tom may only deduct investment advisory fees to the extent that they exceed 2-percent of his adjusted gross income. Thus, Tom's investment advisory fees are not deductible.
C. Summary:
When determining the tax treatment of fees associated with securities investments, a taxpayer should look to "whether the services were performed in the process of acquisition or for investment advice."
78
The taxpayer may be able to deduct investment advisory fees (if related to investment advice), but only if the taxpayer itemizes his deductions and only to the extent that the fees exceed 2-percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. With regards to brokerage fees, however, a taxpayer may use those fees as an offset against the selling or purchasing price of the security, without regard to the 2-percent floor or whether the taxpayer itemizes his deductions.
IV. Legislative History
It is no secret that provisions in the IRC influence taxpayers' conduct. Tax legislation may be motivated explicitly by lawmakers' desire to encourage or discourage certain behavior by taxpayers. Some times certain language inadvertently promotes or discourages conduct by taxpayers. This section will examine the congressional intent behind the enactment of the relevant IRC provisions discussed in this paper. 78 See Honodel, supra note 62, at 365. IRC §212 was originally enacted as the Internal Revenue Act ("IRA") of 1939 as section 23(a)(2).
79
No substantive changes were made when the Code number was changed to §212 in the IRA of 1954.
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In the 1954 Code, § 212, provided that an individual who has elected to itemize his deductions shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year (1) for the production or collection of income, (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income, or, (3) in connection with the determination, collection or refund of any tax. recordkeeping. To some extent, this complexity is necessary to assess accurately one's ability to 79 pay taxes…for the majority of taxpayers, however, the tax system need not be complex. " Perhaps the most important steps taken by the committee bill to reduce the complexity found by many taxpayers are the significant increase in the standard deduction and the imposition of a floor under itemized deductions. Due to these changes, an estimated 13 million taxpayers who presently file itemized returns are expected to file nonitemized returns, which is a 30 percent reduction in the number of itemized returns. These taxpayers will be freed from the need for recordkeeping for many incidental expenditures. 84 The law prior to the 1986 code was that a taxpayer could deduct investment advisory fees from his ordinary income as long as he itemized his deductions. Several proposals were presented to significantly restrict this deduction when the 1986 code was enacted. Under the House bill, the total of the taxpayer's miscellaneous itemized deductions would be allowable only to the extent exceeding one percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 85 The Senate Amendment suggested repealing all miscellaneous itemized deductions that were allowable under then-current law, with the exception of eight deductions (investment advisory fees did not fall within the exception). 86 Thus, the Senate proposed to completely disallow an investment advisory fee deduction. Finally, President Reagan's proposal was as follows: "[t]he miscellaneous itemized deductions would be moved 'above-the-line' (i.e., would also be deductible by nonitemizers), and allowed only to the extent that, when aggregated with the employee expenses described below, they exceeded one percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income (AGI)." 87 The 83 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 58 (1985) . 84 Id. 85 See 1986 U.S.C.C. & A.N. 4118, at II-33 (1986). 86 Id. 87 See JCS-44-85, at 10 (1985).
final negotiated version of the bill subjected miscellaneous itemized deductions to a floor of two percent of the taxpayer's adjust gross income. 88 Prior to the passage of the 1986 Code, the Joint Committee on Taxation wrestled with the issue of whether to impose a floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions. 89 The Committee recognized competing policy considerations in imposing such a floor. 90 The policy in favor of enacting a floor was as follows:
In one sense, the use of a deduction floor fosters simplicity. It relieves taxpayers of the need to keep records substantiating incidental expenses unless they have reason to expect that their allowable deductions may exceed the floor. It also relieves the Internal Revenue Service of the need to audit and verify deductions claimed for numerous small items. The Administration proposal is based on the view that this problem is particularly significant in the case of miscellaneous deductions, and that taxpayers make numerous errors of law regarding allowable deductions in the miscellaneous category. 91 Clearly an objective of the Committee was to simplify the tax laws and reduce potential errors that taxpayers would make in calculating their tax liability. The Committee also acknowledged the potential inequity of a floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions:
On the other hand, to the extent a deduction that ought in theory to be allowable in full is restricted by the use of a floor, the floor is arguably unfair. It penalizes taxpayers who have deductions that are subject to the floor, in comparison to other taxpayers, by depriving them at least in part of a deduction that may be important to the accurate measurement of income. For example, a taxpayer who earned $1,000 in a stock transaction, but paid a broker $500 to manage his assets, would not be able to deduct the fee if his or her total miscellaneous deductions equaled less than one percent of adjusted gross income. Taxpayers with miscellaneous deductions might not object to the burden of keeping accurate records if the result were to reduce their tax liabilities. II-33 (1986) . 89 See generally JCS-36-85 (1985) . 90 Id at 206 91 Id. 92 Id.
The Committee's contemplation of situations where taxpayers would be deprived of a deduction demonstrates a clear recognition that the imposition of a floor would be unfair to some taxpayers.
The Committee also considered the implications of classifying miscellaneous deductions as "above-the-line" or "below-the-line" deductions:
First, there may be a policy decision that all taxpayers should be allowed to benefit from the deduction. However, it is not necessarily clear why this concern should be more applicable to miscellaneous deductions than, for example, to deductions for home mortgage or consumer interest, casualty losses, or medical expenses. Further, nonitemizers benefit from the allowance of deductions that can be claimed only by itemizers, since the zero bracket amount is intended to reflect such expenditures typically made by nonitemizers.
Second, as a matter of tax policy there is a general distinction between above-theline and itemized deductions, although many deductions may be allocated inconsistently with this theoretical distinction. In principle, a deduction is allowed above-the-line if, as an expense of generating income, it must be subtracted from gross income in order to arrive at an accurate measurement of the taxpayer's true net income. By contrast, itemized deductions generally are considered to reflect personal expenditures which, although not properly deductible in measuring economic income, are allowed for reasons of social policy… However, in view of the fact that the Administration proposal generally keeps other itemized deductions below-the-line, the proposal to move miscellaneous deductions above-the-line may instead be based on the view that they are properly allowable in calculating economic income-a view theoretically inconsistent with the decision to allow them only to the extent in excess of a floor, although arguably supportable for simplification purposes. 93 Applying the principles that the Committee set forth for classifying deductions as "abovethe-line" or "below-the-line" it would seem that investment advisory fees are more like expenses of generating income as opposed to personal expenditures. Once again, however, it seems as though simplicity trumped that rationale. 93 Id. at 207.
Judging by the legislative debates and the differing proposals from the House of Representatives, Senate and President Reagan, it is apparent that the legislative focus was principally centered around simplifying the tax code by means of reducing the number of itemizing taxpayers. Unfortunately, Congress did not indicate any concern over the fiduciary duties of investment professionals and the fact that the 1986 Code would favor the use of brokers rather than investment advisors. The next section will examine the fiduciary duty implications applicable to investment professionals since Congress ignored this important issue in enacting the 1986 Code.
V. Fiduciary Duties of Investment Advisors and Brokers
Investment advisors are regulated by the SEC and brokers are regulated by the NASD. The degree of duty owed by brokers depends on the relationship between the broker and his client. "It is settled law, however, that brokers are not liable for their customers losses unless they made an unsuitable recommendation, exercised control over the account, or made a material misstatement of fact. A broker can stand by even if he knows that the customer is engaged in an 94 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 95 See Black supra note 15, at 35 (Professor Black argues that investors are often confused about the roles and responsibilities of the various financial services professionals). 96 See Starkman, supra note 10 (quoting Professor Gross, Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; and co-director of Pace Law's Securities Arbitration Clinic). unsuitably risky investment strategy without an understanding of the risks involved." 97 The important concept here is that a brokers relationship with his customer is not generally considered a fiduciary one, "unless the broker exercises investment discretion over the customer's account." 98 The following subsections will set forth specific duties that brokers owe to their clients.
i.
Suitability:
Brokers have a duty to recommend only those securities that they reasonably believe are suitable for the customer, based on information disclosed by the customer about his other security holdings, his financial status, and his investment objectives. (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
110
Section 17(a) does not apply to purchases of securities. An individual is a seller under Section 17(a) even though he does not own the security being sold, so long as: (1) he solicits the transaction and (2) his solicitation is motivated by personal financial gain.
111
The second prong is satisfied if the person anticipates a share of the profits, even though he may not receive a salary or a commission for his selling efforts.
In addition, Section 9(a)(4) of the SEA Act of 1934 provides guidance on false or misleading statements. Section 9(a)(4) makes it unlawful for any dealer or broker "to make, regarding any security registered on a national securities exchange, for the purposes of inducing the purchase or sale of such security, any statement which was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact, and which he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was so false or misleading."
113 Section 9(a)(4), unlike Section 17(a), applies to both fraudulent purchases and sales. 114 However, the scope of 9(a)(4) is narrower than Section 17(a) in that: (1) it applies only to exchange-listed securities; (2) it prohibits fraudulent misstatements but not omissions; (3) it requires that the broker have the specific purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of the security; and (4) it expressly requires that the broker know or have reason to know of the falsity of the statement. In general there are three main fiduciary duties which are enforceable under IAA §206: (1) disclosure; (2) best interests of clients; and (3) fairness.
120
Disclosure. The first fiduciary duty, of disclosure, requires investment advisors to disclose all material facts about the advisory relationship.
121
The standard for materiality is:
whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable client would attach importance to it.
122
Acting in Client's Best Interests. Investment advisors also has a duty to act only in the best interests of its clients, which requires that the advisor place his clients interests above his own interests when a conflict arises. 123 If a conflict may be present, the investment advisor must disclose the existence of any conflict and obtain his client's consent to the applicable agreement.
124
Courts and the SEC have placed a great deal of emphasis on the duty to disclose all material conflicts of interest.
125
Fairness. An investment advisor also has a fiduciary duty to treat each client fairly.
126
What this fiduciary duty requires is that the investment advisor make certain that he does not benefit one client to the disadvantage of another.
127
Duty of Care. The SEC has also has read an implied duty of care into Section 206.
128
Investment advisors must exercise due care when recommending securities, however, this duty does not extend to the eventual success or failure of his recommendations.
129
It is currently unclear how thoroughly an investment advisor must investigate the securities he recommends. 130 Investment advisors are required to familiarize themselves with the facts which provide the basis for their recommendations and verify them if the source of the information has a substantial interest in the security in question. 131 Courts have held investment advisers liable for failing to disclose they were relying on third-party analysis, especially when the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information was in question.
132
Suitability. Investment advisers also have an implicit duty under the IAA, to provide only suitable investment advice to their clients. 133 The suitability doctrine has arisen predominantly from SEC enforcement actions. A typical situation is where the client's circumstances called for conservative or low-risk investments or when the adviser represented that the investments would be low risk. 134 Other cases have involved aggravating factors, such as the investment in securities of the advisor or its affiliates, or the use of margin. 135 The SEC has articulated policy statements regarding suitability obligations of investment advisors and the steps which advisers should take in satisfying those obligations.
VI. Policy Considerations
In light of the preferable tax treatment of brokerage fees as compared with investment advisory fees, the higher standard of fiduciary duties owed by investment advisors versus brokers, and Congress' failure to consider the implications of favorable tax treatment for brokerage fees, Congress should revisit the issue. Specifically, the law should be changed to level the playing field by allowing a basis adjustment for investment advisory fees or grant preferential treatment to those fees.
Because of the tax law's impact on taxpayer behavior, it is critical that the tax laws do not provide incentives to retain financial services providers who have limited fiduciary duties to their clients. For some investors, brokers may be the most optimal investment professional if that investor simply needs a transaction executed. Other investors may be best suited to hire investment advisors to manage their accounts. Congress should be concerned with the class of investors who are unaware of the differences between brokers and investment advisors. representatives could potentially mention to investors that their commissions will be added to the security's basis, and therefore will not be as costly as investment advisory fees. The savvy investor likely will understand the differing fiduciary relationships of brokers and investment advisors, but those investors will also be better prepared to recognize potentially fraudulent activity and account irregularities. Less sophisticated investors, however, are not likely to understand the fiduciary relationships of various investment advisors and may not be able to identify misconduct.
Understandably, one of Congress' goals in enacting the 1986 Code was simplicity.
139
Simplicity should not, however, come before protecting investors from fraudulent conduct. Even assuming, arguendo, that the IRS has valid reasoning for providing preferential tax treatment for brokerage fees versus investment advisory fees, the fiduciary duty issues cannot be ignored. It is relatively simple and sensible to adjust a security's basis for acquisition or disposition costs (brokerage fees). Because investment advisory accounts are usually geared towards maintenance and management, it may be difficult and impractical to allow a basis adjustment for those types of fees. In attempting to simplify the Code, Congress failed to consider the implications of heavily favoring brokers fees over investment advisory fees. Congress should completely reverse its position and encourage the use of investment advisors as opposed to brokers. The next section will propose ways Congress could rectify this inequity.
VII. Proposed Revisions to the Internal Revenue Code
Having set forth the basic premise that the IRC improperly provides favorable tax treatment to brokerage fees, this section will propose some alternatives to the IRC's current provisions.
One idea would be to disallow basis adjustments for brokerage fees. This approach would certainly be met with a great deal of opposition, especially considering the drastic consequence this provision would have on taxpayers' capital gains. Further, brokerage firms would no longer be able to tell their clients that commissions would be a proper basis adjustment. From a fairness standpoint, it seems counter-intuitive to repeal a long-standing rule that brokers commissions are a proper basis adjustments. Thus, instead of altering the treatment of brokerage fees, it is likely more advantageous to address alternatives to the current IRC provisions dealing with investment advisory fees.
Congress could revise the tax laws to allow a basis adjustment for investment advisory fees, thereby granting equal treatment for the both types of fees. That proposal would be logically sound because investment advisory fees are incurred in managing capital assets (securities), and should therefore be proper adjustments to basis. Further, it would place investment advisory fees on the same footing as brokerage fees and would eliminate the preferential treatment of brokerage fees.
Another idea would be to treat investment advisory fees as itemized deductions, instead of miscellaneous itemized deductions-thereby eliminating the two-percent floor requirement of IRC § 67(a). It is doubtful that this revision would be codified because it would significantly decrease the adjusted gross incomes of taxpayers who use investment advisors. From a policy standpoint, however, this revision would encourage taxpayers to seek investment professionals who owe them a higher level of fiduciary duty. Further with the heightened fiduciary duties, there may be a decline in securities disputes; or alternately, investors will have an easier time recovering monies lost from unscrupulous behavior.
A less desirable alternative would be to decrease the floor to one-percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income, as the House of Representatives proposed for the 1986 Code. 140 With a lower floor, taxpayers would be more likely to get some tax advantage from using investment advisors. Even so, the disparity with regards to brokers' fees would still be significant considering there is a proper basis adjustment without regard of a taxpayer's decision to itemize his deductions nor his adjusted gross income. Optimally tax laws should be rewritten to grant preferential treatment to investment advisory fees. However, the most practical and reasonable revision would be to treat investment advisory fees as proper adjustments to basis. Since Congress was concerned with simplicity in the tax laws, this proposal would be consistent with that strong policy consideration.
Recognizing investment advisory fees as proper basis adjustments would arguably be simpler than the current tax law because it would eliminate taxpayers' need to calculate the two-percent floor and to decide whether to itemize their deductions. Further, this revision would provide an element of consistency in the tax treatment of investment advisory and brokerage fees.
Eliminating the preferential treatment of brokerage fees would have a positive impact on the securities industry by accounting for the fiduciary duty implications of brokers versus investment advisors.
VIII. Conclusion
Due to the volume of Americans investing in securities markets, 142 there needs to be as much protection as possible to prevent misconduct. While the primary burden for protecting investors rests on the SEC, tax laws could be an important source of aid. The current tax law is seriously flawed in that it provides a considerable motivation for taxpayers to retain brokers rather than investment advisors to manage their investment accounts. Brokers are required to meet a level of fiduciary duty that is significantly lower than that of investment advisors, yet brokerage fees are granted preferential tax treatment. At a minimum, the IRC should be modified to treat investment advisory fees and brokerage fees equally as proper adjustments to basis. A better alternative would be to amend the IRC to grant preferable tax treatment for investment advisory fees. Investors deserve investment professionals who are held to a high level of fiduciary duty; Congress should revise the tax laws with this in mind. 142 See Wilkins, supra note 2.
